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//! Types and functions for onion service descriptor encryption.
use tor_hscrypto::{pk::HsBlindId, RevisionCounter, Subcredential};
use tor_llcrypto::cipher::aes::Aes256Ctr as Cipher;
use tor_llcrypto::d::Sha3_256 as Hash;
use tor_llcrypto::d::Shake256 as KDF;
use cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher};
use digest::{ExtendableOutput, FixedOutput, Update, XofReader};
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "hs-service"))]
use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};
use tor_llcrypto::pk::curve25519::PublicKey;
use tor_llcrypto::pk::curve25519::StaticSecret;
use tor_llcrypto::util::ct::CtByteArray;
use zeroize::Zeroizing as Z;
/// Parameters for encrypting or decrypting part of an onion service descriptor.
///
/// The algorithm is as described in section `[HS-DESC-ENCRYPTION-KEYS]` of
/// rend-spec-v3.txt
pub(super) struct HsDescEncryption<'a> {
/// First half of the "SECRET_DATA" field.
/// (See rend-spec v3 2.5.1.1 and 2.5.2.1.)
pub(super) blinded_id: &'a HsBlindId,
/// Second half of the "SECRET_DATA" field.
/// This is absent when handling the superencryption layer (2.5.1.1).
/// For the encryption layer, it is `descriptor_cookie` (2.5.2.1)
/// which is present when descriptor-encryption authentication via
/// `KP_hsc_desc_enc` is in use.
pub(super) desc_enc_nonce: Option<&'a HsDescEncNonce>,
/// The "subcredential" of the onion service.
pub(super) subcredential: &'a Subcredential,
/// The current revision of the onion service descriptor being decrypted.
pub(super) revision: RevisionCounter,
/// A "personalization string".
/// This is set to one of two constants depending on the layer being
/// decrypted.
pub(super) string_const: &'a [u8],
}
/// The length of a client ID.
pub(crate) const HS_DESC_CLIENT_ID_LEN: usize = 8;
/// The length of the `AuthClient` IV.
pub(crate) const HS_DESC_IV_LEN: usize = 16;
/// The length of an `N_hs_desc_enc` nonce (also known as a "descriptor cookie").
pub(crate) const HS_DESC_ENC_NONCE_LEN: usize = 16;
/// A value used in deriving the encryption key for the inner (encryption) layer
/// of onion service encryption.
/// This is `N_hs_desc_enc` in the spec, where sometimes we also call it a
/// "descriptor cookie".
#[derive(derive_more::AsRef, derive_more::From)]
pub(super) struct HsDescEncNonce([u8; HS_DESC_ENC_NONCE_LEN]);
/// Length of our cryptographic salt.
const SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Length of our ersatz MAC.
const MAC_LEN: usize = 32;
impl<'a> HsDescEncryption<'a> {
/// Length of our MAC key.
const MAC_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Length of the cipher key that we use.
const CIPHER_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Length of our cipher's IV.
const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Encrypt a given bytestring using these encryption parameters.
pub(super) fn encrypt<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(&self, rng: &mut R, data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let output_len = data.len() + SALT_LEN + MAC_LEN;
let mut output = Vec::with_capacity(output_len);
let salt: [u8; SALT_LEN] = rng.gen();
let (mut cipher, mut mac) = self.init(&salt);
output.extend_from_slice(&salt[..]);
output.extend_from_slice(data);
cipher.apply_keystream(&mut output[SALT_LEN..]);
mac.update(&output[SALT_LEN..]);
let mut mac_val = Default::default();
mac.finalize_into(&mut mac_val);
output.extend_from_slice(&mac_val);
debug_assert_eq!(output.len(), output_len);
output
/// Decrypt a given bytestring that was first encrypted using these
/// encryption parameters.
pub(super) fn decrypt(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, DecryptionError> {
if data.len() < SALT_LEN + MAC_LEN {
return Err(DecryptionError::default());
let msg_len = data.len() - SALT_LEN - MAC_LEN;
let salt = data[0..SALT_LEN]
.try_into()
.expect("Failed try_into for 16-byte array.");
let ciphertext = &data[SALT_LEN..(SALT_LEN + msg_len)];
let expected_mac = CtByteArray::from(
<[u8; MAC_LEN]>::try_from(&data[SALT_LEN + msg_len..SALT_LEN + msg_len + MAC_LEN])
.expect("Failed try_into for 32-byte array."),
);
// check mac.
mac.update(ciphertext);
let mut received_mac = CtByteArray::from([0_u8; MAC_LEN]);
mac.finalize_into(received_mac.as_mut().into());
if received_mac != expected_mac {
let mut decrypted = ciphertext.to_vec();
cipher.apply_keystream(&mut decrypted[..]);
Ok(decrypted)
/// Return the cryptographic objects that are used for en/decrypting and
/// authenticating a HsDesc layer, given these parameters and a provided
/// salt.
/// Calculates `SECRET_KEY` and `SECRET_IV` (as `Cipher`) and `MAC_KEY` (as `Hash`)
/// from rend-spec-v3 2.5.3 (`[HS-DESC-ENCRYPTION-KEYS]`).
/// `Hash` is the required intermediate value in the calculation of `D_MAC`:
/// It is in the state just after the `SALT` has been added;
/// the ciphertext should be added, and then it should be finalized.
fn init(&self, salt: &[u8; 16]) -> (Cipher, Hash) {
let mut key_stream = self.get_kdf(salt).finalize_xof();
let mut key = Z::new([0_u8; Self::CIPHER_KEY_LEN]);
let mut iv = Z::new([0_u8; Self::IV_LEN]);
let mut mac_key = Z::new([0_u8; Self::MAC_KEY_LEN]);
key_stream.read(&mut key[..]);
key_stream.read(&mut iv[..]);
key_stream.read(&mut mac_key[..]);
let cipher = Cipher::new(key.as_ref().into(), iv.as_ref().into());
let mut mac = Hash::default();
mac.update(&(Self::MAC_KEY_LEN as u64).to_be_bytes());
mac.update(&mac_key[..]);
mac.update(&(salt.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
mac.update(&salt[..]);
(cipher, mac)
/// Return a KDF that can yield the keys to be used for encryption with
/// these key parameters.
/// Calculates `keys` from rend-spec-v3 2.5.3 (`[HS-DESC-ENCRYPTION-KEYS]`)
/// as required for the two instantiations of `HS-DESC-ENCRYPTION-KEYS` in
/// 2.5.1.1 ("First layer encryption logic") and 2.5.2.1 ("Second layer
/// encryption logic").
fn get_kdf(&self, salt: &[u8; 16]) -> KDF {
let mut kdf = KDF::default();
// secret_input = SECRET_DATA | N_hs_subcred | INT_8(revision_counter)
//
// (SECRET_DATA is always KP_blind_id (2.5.1.1), or KP_blind_id | N_hs_desc_nonce) (2.5.2.1).
kdf.update(self.blinded_id.as_ref());
if let Some(cookie) = self.desc_enc_nonce {
kdf.update(cookie.as_ref());
kdf.update(self.subcredential.as_ref());
kdf.update(&u64::from(self.revision).to_be_bytes());
// keys = KDF(secret_input | salt | STRING_CONSTANT, S_KEY_LEN + S_IV_LEN + MAC_KEY_LEN)
kdf.update(salt);
kdf.update(self.string_const);
kdf
/// An error that occurs when decrypting an onion service descriptor.
/// This error is deliberately uninformative, to avoid side channels.
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("Unable to decrypt onion service descriptor.")]
pub struct DecryptionError {}
/// Create the CLIENT-ID and COOKIE-KEY required for hidden service restricted discovery.
/// This is used by HS clients to decrypt the descriptor cookie from the onion service descriptor,
/// and by HS services to build the client-auth sections of descriptors.
/// Section 2.5.1.2. of rend-spec-v3 says:
/// ```text
/// SECRET_SEED = x25519(hs_y, client_X)
/// = x25519(client_y, hs_X)
/// KEYS = KDF(N_hs_subcred | SECRET_SEED, 40)
/// CLIENT-ID = first 8 bytes of KEYS
/// COOKIE-KEY = last 32 bytes of KEYS
/// Where:
/// hs_{X,y} = K{P,S}_hss_desc_enc
/// client_{X,Y} = K{P,S}_hsc_desc_enc
/// ```
pub(crate) fn build_descriptor_cookie_key(
our_secret_key: &StaticSecret,
their_public_key: &PublicKey,
subcredential: &Subcredential,
) -> (CtByteArray<8>, [u8; 32]) {
let secret_seed = our_secret_key.diffie_hellman(their_public_key);
kdf.update(subcredential.as_ref());
kdf.update(secret_seed.as_bytes());
let mut keys = kdf.finalize_xof();
let mut client_id = CtByteArray::from([0_u8; 8]);
let mut cookie_key = [0_u8; 32];
keys.read(client_id.as_mut());
keys.read(&mut cookie_key);
(client_id, cookie_key)
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
// @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]
#![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]
#![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::unchecked_duration_subtraction)]
#![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
//! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
use super::*;
use tor_basic_utils::test_rng::testing_rng;
#[test]
fn roundtrip_basics() {
let blinded_id = [7; 32].into();
let subcredential = [11; 32].into();
let revision = 13.into();
let string_const = "greetings puny humans";
let params = HsDescEncryption {
blinded_id: &blinded_id,
desc_enc_nonce: None,
subcredential: &subcredential,
revision,
string_const: string_const.as_bytes(),
};
let mut rng = testing_rng();
let bigmsg: Vec<u8> = (1..123).cycle().take(1021).collect();
for message in [&b""[..], &b"hello world"[..], &bigmsg[..]] {
let mut encrypted = params.encrypt(&mut rng, message);
assert_eq!(encrypted.len(), message.len() + 48);
let decrypted = params.decrypt(&encrypted[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(message, &decrypted);
// Make sure we can't decrypt a partial input.
let decryption_err = params.decrypt(&encrypted[..encrypted.len() - 1]);
assert!(decryption_err.is_err());
// Frob a point in the encrypted form and ensure we won't decrypt.
encrypted[7] ^= 3;
let decryption_err = params.decrypt(&encrypted[..]);
fn too_short() {
assert!(params.decrypt(b"").is_err());
assert!(params.decrypt(&[0_u8; 47]).is_err());