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//! Code to handle the inner document of an onion service descriptor.
use std::time::SystemTime;
use super::{IntroAuthType, IntroPointDesc};
use crate::batching_split_before::IteratorExt as _;
use crate::parse::tokenize::{ItemResult, NetDocReader};
use crate::parse::{keyword::Keyword, parser::SectionRules};
use crate::types::misc::{UnvalidatedEdCert, B64};
use crate::{NetdocErrorKind as EK, Result};
use itertools::Itertools as _;
use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use smallvec::SmallVec;
use tor_checkable::signed::SignatureGated;
use tor_checkable::timed::TimerangeBound;
use tor_checkable::Timebound;
use tor_hscrypto::pk::{HsIntroPtSessionIdKey, HsSvcNtorKey};
use tor_hscrypto::NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX;
use tor_llcrypto::pk::ed25519::Ed25519Identity;
use tor_llcrypto::pk::{curve25519, ed25519, ValidatableSignature};
/// The contents of the inner document of an onion service descriptor.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hsdesc-inner-docs", visibility::make(pub))]
pub(crate) struct HsDescInner {
/// The authentication types that this onion service accepts when
/// connecting.
//
// TODO: This should probably be a bitfield or enum-set of something.
// Once we know whether the "password" authentication type really exists,
// let's change to a better representation here.
pub(super) intro_auth_types: Option<SmallVec<[IntroAuthType; 2]>>,
/// Is this onion service a "single onion service?"
///
/// (A "single onion service" is one that is not attempting to anonymize
/// itself.)
pub(super) single_onion_service: bool,
/// A list of advertised introduction points and their contact info.
//
// Always has >= 1 and <= NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX entries
pub(super) intro_points: Vec<IntroPointDesc>,
}
decl_keyword! {
pub(crate) HsInnerKwd {
"create2-formats" => CREATE2_FORMATS,
"intro-auth-required" => INTRO_AUTH_REQUIRED,
"single-onion-service" => SINGLE_ONION_SERVICE,
"introduction-point" => INTRODUCTION_POINT,
"onion-key" => ONION_KEY,
"auth-key" => AUTH_KEY,
"enc-key" => ENC_KEY,
"enc-key-cert" => ENC_KEY_CERT,
"legacy-key" => LEGACY_KEY,
"legacy-key-cert" => LEGACY_KEY_CERT,
}
}
/// Rules about how keywords appear in the header part of an onion service
/// descriptor.
static HS_INNER_HEADER_RULES: Lazy<SectionRules<HsInnerKwd>> = Lazy::new(|| {
use HsInnerKwd::*;
let mut rules = SectionRules::builder();
rules.add(CREATE2_FORMATS.rule().required().args(1..));
rules.add(INTRO_AUTH_REQUIRED.rule().args(1..));
rules.add(SINGLE_ONION_SERVICE.rule());
rules.add(UNRECOGNIZED.rule().may_repeat().obj_optional());
rules.build()
});
/// Rules about how keywords appear in each introduction-point section of an
/// onion service descriptor.
static HS_INNER_INTRO_RULES: Lazy<SectionRules<HsInnerKwd>> = Lazy::new(|| {
use HsInnerKwd::*;
let mut rules = SectionRules::builder();
rules.add(INTRODUCTION_POINT.rule().required().args(1..));
// Note: we're labeling ONION_KEY and ENC_KEY as "may_repeat", since even
// though rend-spec labels them as "exactly once", they are allowed to
// appear more than once so long as they appear only once _with an "ntor"_
// key. torspec!110 tries to document this issue.
rules.add(ONION_KEY.rule().required().may_repeat().args(2..));
rules.add(AUTH_KEY.rule().required().obj_required());
rules.add(ENC_KEY.rule().required().may_repeat().args(2..));
rules.add(ENC_KEY_CERT.rule().required().obj_required());
rules.add(UNRECOGNIZED.rule().may_repeat().obj_optional());
// NOTE: We never look at the LEGACY_KEY* fields. This does provide a
// distinguisher for Arti implementations and C tor implementations, but
// that's outside of Arti's threat model.
//
// (In fact, there's an easier distinguisher, since we enforce UTF-8 in
// these documents, and C tor does not.)
rules.build()
});
/// Helper type returned when we parse an HsDescInner.
pub(crate) type UncheckedHsDescInner = TimerangeBound<SignatureGated<HsDescInner>>;
/// Information about one of the certificates inside an HsDescInner.
///
/// This is a teporary structure that we use when parsing.
struct InnerCertData {
/// The identity of the key that purportedly signs this certificate.
signing_key: Ed25519Identity,
/// The key that is being signed.
subject_key: ed25519::PublicKey,
/// A detached signature object that we must validate before we can conclude
/// that the certificate is valid.
signature: Box<dyn ValidatableSignature>,
/// The time when the certificate expires.
expiry: SystemTime,
}
/// Decode a certificate from `tok`, and check that its tag and type are
/// expected, that it contains a signing key, and that both signing and subject
/// keys are Ed25519.
///
/// On success, return an InnerCertData.
fn handle_inner_certificate(
tok: &crate::parse::tokenize::Item<HsInnerKwd>,
want_tag: &str,
want_type: tor_cert::CertType,
) -> Result<InnerCertData> {
let make_err = |e, msg| {
EK::BadObjectVal
.with_msg(msg)
.with_source(e)
.at_pos(tok.pos())
};
let cert = tok
.parse_obj::<UnvalidatedEdCert>(want_tag)?
.check_cert_type(want_type)?
.into_unchecked();
// These certs have to include a signing key.
let cert = cert
.should_have_signing_key()
.map_err(|e| make_err(e, "Certificate was not self-signed"))?;
// Peel off the signature.
let (cert, signature) = cert
.dangerously_split()
.map_err(|e| make_err(e, "Certificate was not Ed25519-signed"))?;
let signature = Box::new(signature);
// Peel off the expiration
let cert = cert.dangerously_assume_timely();
let expiry = cert.expiry();
let subject_key = cert
.subject_key()
.as_ed25519()
.ok_or_else(|| {
EK::BadObjectVal
.with_msg("Certified key was not Ed25519")
.at_pos(tok.pos())
})?
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| {
EK::BadObjectVal
.with_msg("Certified key was not valid Ed25519")
.at_pos(tok.pos())
})?;
let signing_key = *cert.signing_key().ok_or_else(|| {
EK::BadObjectVal
.with_msg("Signing key was not Ed25519")
.at_pos(tok.pos())
})?;
Ok(InnerCertData {
signing_key,
subject_key,
signature,
expiry,
})
}
impl HsDescInner {
/// Attempt to parse the inner document of an onion service descriptor from a
/// provided string.
///
/// On success, return the signing key that was used for every certificate in the
/// inner document, and the inner document itself.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hsdesc-inner-docs", visibility::make(pub))]
pub(super) fn parse(s: &str) -> Result<(Option<Ed25519Identity>, UncheckedHsDescInner)> {
let mut reader = NetDocReader::new(s);
let result = Self::take_from_reader(&mut reader).map_err(|e| e.within(s))?;
Ok(result)
}
/// Attempt to parse the inner document of an onion service descriptor from a
/// provided reader.
///
/// On success, return the signing key that was used for every certificate in the
/// inner document, and the inner document itself.
fn take_from_reader(
input: &mut NetDocReader<'_, HsInnerKwd>,
) -> Result<(Option<Ed25519Identity>, UncheckedHsDescInner)> {
use HsInnerKwd::*;
// Split up the input at INTRODUCTION_POINT items
let mut sections =
input.batching_split_before_with_header(|item| item.is_ok_with_kwd(INTRODUCTION_POINT));
// Parse the header.
let header = HS_INNER_HEADER_RULES.parse(&mut sections)?;
// Make sure that the "ntor" handshake is supported in the list of
// `HTYPE`s (handshake types) in `create2-formats`.
{
let tok = header.required(CREATE2_FORMATS)?;
// If we ever want to support a different HTYPE, we'll need to
// store at least the intersection between "their" and "our" supported
// HTYPEs. For now we only support one, so either this set is empty
// and failing now is fine, or `ntor` (2) is supported, so fine.
if !tok.args().any(|s| s == "2") {
return Err(EK::BadArgument
.at_pos(tok.pos())
.with_msg("Onion service descriptor does not support ntor handshake."));
}
}
// Check whether any kind of introduction-point authentication is
// specified in an `intro-auth-required` line.
let auth_types = if let Some(tok) = header.get(INTRO_AUTH_REQUIRED) {
let mut auth_types: SmallVec<[IntroAuthType; 2]> = SmallVec::new();
let mut push = |at| {
if !auth_types.contains(&at) {
auth_types.push(at);
}
};
for arg in tok.args() {
#[allow(clippy::single_match)]
match arg {
"ed25519" => push(IntroAuthType::Ed25519),
_ => (), // Ignore unrecognized types.
}
}
// .. but if no types are recognized, we can't connect.
if auth_types.is_empty() {
return Err(EK::BadArgument
.at_pos(tok.pos())
.with_msg("No recognized introduction authentication methods."));
}
Some(auth_types)
} else {
None
};
// Recognize `single-onion-service` if it's there.
let is_single_onion_service = header.get(SINGLE_ONION_SERVICE).is_some();
let mut signatures = Vec::new();
let mut expirations = Vec::new();
let mut cert_signing_key: Option<Ed25519Identity> = None;
// Now we parse the introduction points. Each of these will be a
// section starting with `introduction-point`, ending right before the
// next `introduction-point` (or before the end of the document.)
let mut intro_points = Vec::new();
let mut sections = sections.subsequent();
while let Some(mut ipt_section) = sections.next_batch() {
let ipt_section = HS_INNER_INTRO_RULES.parse(&mut ipt_section)?;
// Parse link-specifiers
let link_specifiers = {
let tok = ipt_section.required(INTRODUCTION_POINT)?;
let ls = tok.parse_arg::<B64>(0)?;
let mut r = tor_bytes::Reader::from_slice(ls.as_bytes());
let n = r.take_u8()?;
let res = r.extract_n(n.into())?;
r.should_be_exhausted()?;
res
};
// Parse the ntor "onion-key" (`KP_ntor`) of the introduction point.
let ntor_onion_key = {
let tok = ipt_section
.slice(ONION_KEY)
.iter()
.filter(|item| item.arg(0) == Some("ntor"))
.exactly_one()
.map_err(|_| EK::MissingToken.with_msg("No unique ntor onion key found."))?;
tok.parse_arg::<B64>(1)?.into_array()?.into()
};
// Extract the auth_key (`KP_hs_ipt_sid`) from the (unchecked)
// "auth-key" certificate.
let auth_key: HsIntroPtSessionIdKey = {
// Note that this certificate does not actually serve any
// function _as_ a certificate; it was meant to cross-certify
// the descriptor signing key (`KP_hs_desc_sign`) using the
// authentication key (`KP_hs_ipt_sid`). But the C tor
// implementation got it backwards.
//
// We have to parse this certificate to extract
// `KP_hs_ipt_sid`, but we don't actually need to validate it:
// it appears inside the inner document, which is already signed
// with `KP_hs_desc_sign`. Nonetheless, we validate it anyway,
// since that's what C tor does.
//
// See documentation for `CertType::HS_IP_V_SIGNING for more
// info`.
let tok = ipt_section.required(AUTH_KEY)?;
let InnerCertData {
signing_key,
subject_key,
signature,
expiry,
} = handle_inner_certificate(
tok,
"ED25519 CERT",
tor_cert::CertType::HS_IP_V_SIGNING,
)?;
expirations.push(expiry);
signatures.push(signature);
if cert_signing_key.get_or_insert(signing_key) != &signing_key {
return Err(EK::BadObjectVal
.at_pos(tok.pos())
.with_msg("Mismatched signing key"));
}
subject_key.into()
};
// Extract the key `KP_hss_ntor` that we'll use for our
// handshake with the onion service itself. This comes from the
// "enc-key" item.
let svc_ntor_key: HsSvcNtorKey = {
let tok = ipt_section
.slice(ENC_KEY)
.iter()
.filter(|item| item.arg(0) == Some("ntor"))
.exactly_one()
.map_err(|_| EK::MissingToken.with_msg("No unique ntor onion key found."))?;
let key = curve25519::PublicKey::from(tok.parse_arg::<B64>(1)?.into_array()?);
key.into()
};
// Check that the key in the "enc-key-cert" item matches the
// `KP_hss_ntor` we just extracted.
{
// NOTE: As above, this certificate is backwards, and hence
// useless. Still, we validate it because that is what C tor does.
let tok = ipt_section.required(ENC_KEY_CERT)?;
let InnerCertData {
signing_key,
subject_key,
signature,
expiry,
} = handle_inner_certificate(
tok,
"ED25519 CERT",
tor_cert::CertType::HS_IP_CC_SIGNING,
)?;
expirations.push(expiry);
signatures.push(signature);
// Yes, the sign bit is always zero here. This would have a 50%
// chance of making the key unusable for verification. But since
// the certificate is backwards (see above) we don't actually have
// to check any signatures with it.
let sign_bit = 0;
let expected_ed_key =
tor_llcrypto::pk::keymanip::convert_curve25519_to_ed25519_public(
&svc_ntor_key,
sign_bit,
);
if expected_ed_key != Some(subject_key) {
return Err(EK::BadObjectVal
.at_pos(tok.pos())
.with_msg("Mismatched subject key"));
}
// Make sure signing key is as expected.
if cert_signing_key.get_or_insert(signing_key) != &signing_key {
return Err(EK::BadObjectVal
.at_pos(tok.pos())
.with_msg("Mismatched signing key"));
}
};
// TODO SPEC: State who enforces NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX and how (hsdirs, clients?)
//
// Simply discard extraneous IPTs. The MAX value is hardcoded now, but a future
// protocol evolution might increase it and we should probably still work then.
//
// If the spec intended that hsdirs ought to validate this and reject descriptors
// with more than MAX (when they can), then this code is wrong because it would
// prevent any caller (eg future hsdir code in arti relay) from seeing the violation.
if intro_points.len() < NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX {
intro_points.push(IntroPointDesc {
link_specifiers,
ipt_ntor_key: ntor_onion_key,
ipt_sid_key: auth_key,
svc_ntor_key,
});
}
}
// TODO SPEC: Might a HS publish descriptor with no IPTs to declare itself down?
// If it might, then we should:
// - accept such descriptors here
// - check for this situation explicitly in tor-hsclient connect.rs intro_rend_connect
// - bail with a new `ConnError` (with ErrorKind OnionServiceNotRunning)
// with the consequence that once we obtain such a descriptor,
// we'll be satisfied with it and consider the HS down until the descriptor expires.
if intro_points.is_empty() {
return Err(EK::MissingEntry.with_msg("no introduction points"));
}
let inner = HsDescInner {
intro_auth_types: auth_types,
single_onion_service: is_single_onion_service,
intro_points,
};
let sig_gated = SignatureGated::new(inner, signatures);
let time_bound = match expirations.iter().min() {
Some(t) => TimerangeBound::new(sig_gated, ..t),
None => TimerangeBound::new(sig_gated, ..),
};
Ok((cert_signing_key, time_bound))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
// @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]
#![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]
#![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::unchecked_duration_subtraction)]
#![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
//! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
use std::iter;
use hex_literal::hex;
use itertools::chain;
use tor_checkable::{SelfSigned, Timebound};
use super::*;
use crate::doc::hsdesc::{
middle::HsDescMiddle,
outer::HsDescOuter,
test_data::{TEST_DATA, TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL},
};
// This is the inner document from hsdesc1.txt aka TEST_DATA
const TEST_DATA_INNER: &str = include_str!("../../../testdata/hsdesc-inner.txt");
#[test]
fn inner_text() {
use crate::NetdocErrorKind as NEK;
let _desc = HsDescInner::parse(TEST_DATA_INNER).unwrap();
let none = format!(
"{}\n",
TEST_DATA_INNER
.split_once("\nintroduction-point")
.unwrap()
.0,
);
let err = HsDescInner::parse(&none).map(|_| &none).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.kind, NEK::MissingEntry);
let ipt = format!(
"introduction-point{}",
TEST_DATA_INNER
.rsplit_once("\nintroduction-point")
.unwrap()
.1,
);
for n in NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX..NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX + 2 {
let many = chain!(iter::once(&*none), iter::repeat(&*ipt).take(n),).collect::<String>();
let desc = HsDescInner::parse(&many).unwrap();
let desc = desc
.1
.dangerously_into_parts()
.0
.dangerously_assume_wellsigned();
assert_eq!(desc.intro_points.len(), NUM_INTRO_POINT_MAX);
}
}
#[test]
fn parse_good() -> Result<()> {
let desc = HsDescOuter::parse(TEST_DATA)?
.dangerously_assume_wellsigned()
.dangerously_assume_timely();
let subcred = TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL.into();
let body = desc.decrypt_body(&subcred).unwrap();
let body = std::str::from_utf8(&body[..]).unwrap();
let middle = HsDescMiddle::parse(body)?;
let inner_body = middle
.decrypt_inner(&desc.blinded_id(), desc.revision_counter(), &subcred, None)
.unwrap();
let inner_body = std::str::from_utf8(&inner_body).unwrap();
let (ed_id, inner) = HsDescInner::parse(inner_body)?;
let inner = inner
.check_valid_at(&humantime::parse_rfc3339("2023-01-23T15:00:00Z").unwrap())
.unwrap()
.check_signature()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(ed_id.as_ref(), Some(desc.desc_sign_key_id()));
assert!(inner.intro_auth_types.is_none());
assert_eq!(inner.single_onion_service, false);
assert_eq!(inner.intro_points.len(), 3);
let ipt0 = &inner.intro_points[0];
assert_eq!(
ipt0.ipt_ntor_key().as_bytes(),
&hex!("553BF9F9E1979D6F5D5D7D20BB3FE7272E32E22B6E86E35C76A7CA8A377E402F")
);
assert_ne!(ipt0.link_specifiers, inner.intro_points[1].link_specifiers);
Ok(())
}
}