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//! Utility functions for the rest of the crate.
use tor_error::error_report;
use tor_persist::StateMgr;
/// A RAII guard that calls `<T as StateMgr>::unlock` on drop.
pub(crate) struct StateMgrUnlockGuard<'a, T: StateMgr + 'a> {
/// The inner manager.
mgr: &'a T,
}
impl<'a, T: StateMgr + 'a> Drop for StateMgrUnlockGuard<'a, T> {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if let Err(e) = self.mgr.unlock() {
error_report!(e, "Failed to unlock state manager");
impl<'a, T: StateMgr + 'a> StateMgrUnlockGuard<'a, T> {
/// Create an unlock guard.
pub(crate) fn new(mgr: &'a T) -> Self {
Self { mgr }
/// Consume the unlock guard without unlocking the state manager.
pub(crate) fn disarm(self) {
std::mem::forget(self);
/// Return true if we are running with elevated privileges via setuid, setgid,
/// or a similar mechanism.
///
/// We detect this by checking whether there is any difference between our real,
/// effective, and saved user IDs; and then by doing the same check for our
/// group IDs.
/// On non-unix platforms, this function always returns false.
pub(crate) fn running_as_setuid() -> bool {
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
// this is the exhaustive list of os where `getresuid` and `getresgid` are available
if #[cfg(any(target_os = "fuchsia",
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "l4re",
target_os = "android",
target_os = "emscripten",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "dragonfly",
target_os = "openbsd",
))] {
// Use `libc` to find our real, effective, and saved UIDs and GIDs.
//
// On systems with setresuid, a caller can (and people sometimes do)
// arrange for ruid==euid != saveduid, and that is still set-id:
// the process can retain privilege.
let mut resuid = [0, 0, 0];
let mut resgid = [0, 0, 0];
unsafe {
// We ignore failures from getresuid or getresgid: these syscalls
// can only fail if we give them bad pointers, if they are disabled
// via a maddened sandbox, or something like that. In that case, we'll
// just assume that the user knows what they're doing.
let _ = libc::getresuid(&mut resuid[0], &mut resuid[1], &mut resuid[2]);
let _ = libc::getresgid(&mut resgid[0], &mut resgid[1], &mut resgid[2]);
// The user can change any of their (real, effective, saved) IDs to any
// of their (real, effective, saved) IDs. Thus, privileges are elevated
// if there is any difference between these IDs.
let same_resuid = resuid.iter().all(|uid| uid == &resuid[0]);
let same_resgid = resgid.iter().all(|gid| gid == &resgid[0]);
!(same_resuid && same_resgid)
} else if #[cfg(any(target_family = "unix", target_os = "vxworks"))] {
// Some unix-like OS lacks setresuid/setresgid, while possibly still having a saved
// set-id, which we then can't query. I *think* it is even possible to create a
// situation where ruid==euid != saveduid. But it is not possible to detect it
// (other than maybe by experimentally guessing that saved set-id is zero and trying
// to seteuid(0) - a bad move).
// So, use test for euid==ruid instead, which is about the best we can do.
// We "sort of" ignore failures: in each case, we insist that both calls succeed,
// giving the same answer, or both calls fail. This ought to work well enough.
let same_reuid = unsafe { libc::geteuid() == libc::getuid() };
let same_regid = unsafe { libc::getegid() == libc::getgid() };
!(same_reuid && same_regid)
} else {
false