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#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_auto_cfg, doc_cfg))]
#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")]
// @@ begin lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(renamed_and_removed_lints)] // @@REMOVE_WHEN(ci_arti_stable)
#![allow(unknown_lints)] // @@REMOVE_WHEN(ci_arti_nightly)
#![warn(missing_docs)]
#![warn(noop_method_call)]
#![warn(unreachable_pub)]
#![warn(clippy::all)]
#![deny(clippy::await_holding_lock)]
#![deny(clippy::cargo_common_metadata)]
#![deny(clippy::cast_lossless)]
#![deny(clippy::checked_conversions)]
#![warn(clippy::cognitive_complexity)]
#![deny(clippy::debug_assert_with_mut_call)]
#![deny(clippy::exhaustive_enums)]
#![deny(clippy::exhaustive_structs)]
#![deny(clippy::expl_impl_clone_on_copy)]
#![deny(clippy::fallible_impl_from)]
#![deny(clippy::implicit_clone)]
#![deny(clippy::large_stack_arrays)]
#![warn(clippy::manual_ok_or)]
#![deny(clippy::missing_docs_in_private_items)]
#![warn(clippy::needless_borrow)]
#![warn(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
#![warn(clippy::option_option)]
#![deny(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![deny(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![warn(clippy::rc_buffer)]
#![deny(clippy::ref_option_ref)]
#![warn(clippy::semicolon_if_nothing_returned)]
#![warn(clippy::trait_duplication_in_bounds)]
#![deny(clippy::unchecked_duration_subtraction)]
#![deny(clippy::unnecessary_wraps)]
#![warn(clippy::unseparated_literal_suffix)]
#![deny(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::let_unit_value)] // This can reasonably be done for explicitness
#![allow(clippy::uninlined_format_args)]
#![allow(clippy::significant_drop_in_scrutinee)] // arti/-/merge_requests/588/#note_2812945
#![allow(clippy::result_large_err)] // temporary workaround for arti#587
#![allow(clippy::needless_raw_string_hashes)] // complained-about code is fine, often best
//! <!-- @@ end lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
mod err;
pub mod rsa;
use caret::caret_int;
use tor_bytes::{Error as BytesError, Result as BytesResult};
use tor_bytes::{Readable, Reader};
use tor_llcrypto::pk::ed25519::Verifier as _;
use tor_llcrypto::pk::*;
use std::time;
pub use err::CertError;
#[cfg(feature = "encode")]
mod encode;
pub use encode::EncodedEd25519Cert;
pub use err::CertEncodeError;
/// A Result defined to use CertError
type CertResult<T> = std::result::Result<T, CertError>;
caret_int! {
/// Recognized values for Tor's certificate type field.
///
/// In the names used here, "X_V_Y" means "key X verifying key Y",
/// whereas "X_CC_Y" means "key X cross-certifying key Y". In both
/// cases, X is the key that is doing the signing, and Y is the key
/// or object that is getting signed.
/// Not every one of these types is valid for an Ed25519
/// certificate. Some are for X.509 certs in a CERTS cell; some
/// are for RSA->Ed crosscerts in a CERTS cell.
pub struct CertType(u8) {
/// TLS link key, signed with RSA identity. X.509 format. (Obsolete)
TLS_LINK_X509 = 0x01,
/// Self-signed RSA identity certificate. X.509 format. (Legacy)
RSA_ID_X509 = 0x02,
/// RSA lnk authentication key signed with RSA identity
/// key. X.509 format. (Obsolete)
LINK_AUTH_X509 = 0x03,
/// Identity verifying a signing key, directly.
IDENTITY_V_SIGNING = 0x04,
/// Signing key verifying a TLS certificate by digest.
SIGNING_V_TLS_CERT = 0x05,
/// Signing key verifying a link authentication key.
SIGNING_V_LINK_AUTH = 0x06,
/// RSA identity key certifying an Ed25519 identity key. RSA
/// crosscert format. (Legacy)
RSA_ID_V_IDENTITY = 0x07,
/// For onion services: short-term descriptor signing key
/// (`KP_hs_desc_sign`), signed with blinded onion service identity
/// (`KP_hs_blind_id`).
HS_BLINDED_ID_V_SIGNING = 0x08,
/// For onion services: Introduction point authentication key
/// (`KP_hs_ipt_sid`), signed with short term descriptor signing key
/// (`KP_hs_desc_sign`).
/// This one is, sadly, a bit complicated. In the original specification
/// it was meant to be a cross-certificate, where the signature would be
/// _on_ the descriptor signing key, _signed with_ the intro TID key.
/// But we got it backwards in the C Tor implementation, and now, for
/// compatibility, we are stuck doing it backwards in the future.
/// If we find in the future that it is actually important to
/// cross-certify these keys (as originally intended), then we should
/// add a new certificate type, and put the new certificate in the onion
/// service descriptor.
HS_IP_V_SIGNING = 0x09,
/// An ntor key converted to a ed25519 key, cross-certifying an
/// identity key.
NTOR_CC_IDENTITY = 0x0A,
/// For onion services: Ntor encryption key (`KP_hss_ntor`),
/// converted to ed25519, signed with the descriptor signing key
/// As with [`HS_IP_V_SIGNING`](CertType::HS_IP_V_SIGNING), this
/// certificate type is backwards. In the original specification it was
/// meant to be a cross certificate, with the signing and signed keys
/// reversed.
HS_IP_CC_SIGNING = 0x0B,
}
/// Extension identifiers for extensions in certificates.
pub struct ExtType(u8) {
/// Extension indicating an Ed25519 key that signed this certificate.
/// Certificates do not always contain the key that signed them.
SIGNED_WITH_ED25519_KEY = 0x04,
/// Identifiers for the type of key or object getting signed.
pub struct KeyType(u8) {
/// Identifier for an Ed25519 key.
ED25519_KEY = 0x01,
/// Identifier for the SHA256 of an DER-encoded RSA key.
SHA256_OF_RSA = 0x02,
/// Identifies the SHA256 of an X.509 certificate.
SHA256_OF_X509 = 0x03,
/// Structure for an Ed25519-signed certificate as described in Tor's
/// cert-spec.txt.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "encode", derive(derive_builder::Builder))]
#[cfg_attr(
feature = "encode",
builder(name = "Ed25519CertConstructor", build_fn(skip))
)]
pub struct Ed25519Cert {
/// How many _hours_ after the epoch will this certificate expire?
#[cfg_attr(feature = "encode", builder(setter(custom)))]
exp_hours: u32,
/// Type of the certificate; recognized values are in certtype::*
cert_type: CertType,
/// The key or object being certified.
cert_key: CertifiedKey,
/// A list of extensions.
#[allow(unused)]
extensions: Vec<CertExt>,
/// The key that signed this cert.
/// Once the cert has been unwrapped from an KeyUnknownCert, this field will
/// be set. If there is a `SignedWithEd25519` extension in
/// `self.extensions`, this will match it.
signed_with: Option<ed25519::Ed25519Identity>,
/// One of the data types that can be certified by an Ed25519Cert.
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum CertifiedKey {
/// An Ed25519 public key, signed directly.
Ed25519(ed25519::Ed25519Identity),
/// The SHA256 digest of a DER-encoded RsaPublicKey
RsaSha256Digest([u8; 32]),
/// The SHA256 digest of an X.509 certificate.
X509Sha256Digest([u8; 32]),
/// Some unrecognized key type.
Unrecognized(UnrecognizedKey),
/// A key whose type we didn't recognize.
pub struct UnrecognizedKey {
/// Actual type of the key.
key_type: KeyType,
/// digest of the key, or the key itself.
key_digest: [u8; 32],
impl CertifiedKey {
/// Return the byte that identifies the type of this key.
pub fn key_type(&self) -> KeyType {
match self {
CertifiedKey::Ed25519(_) => KeyType::ED25519_KEY,
CertifiedKey::RsaSha256Digest(_) => KeyType::SHA256_OF_RSA,
CertifiedKey::X509Sha256Digest(_) => KeyType::SHA256_OF_X509,
CertifiedKey::Unrecognized(u) => u.key_type,
/// Return the bytes that are used for the body of this certified
/// key or object.
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
CertifiedKey::Ed25519(k) => k.as_bytes(),
CertifiedKey::RsaSha256Digest(k) => &k[..],
CertifiedKey::X509Sha256Digest(k) => &k[..],
CertifiedKey::Unrecognized(u) => &u.key_digest[..],
/// If this is an Ed25519 public key, return Some(key).
/// Otherwise, return None.
pub fn as_ed25519(&self) -> Option<&ed25519::Ed25519Identity> {
CertifiedKey::Ed25519(k) => Some(k),
_ => None,
/// Try to extract a CertifiedKey from a Reader, given that we have
/// already read its type as `key_type`.
fn from_reader(key_type: KeyType, r: &mut Reader<'_>) -> BytesResult<Self> {
Ok(match key_type {
KeyType::ED25519_KEY => CertifiedKey::Ed25519(r.extract()?),
KeyType::SHA256_OF_RSA => CertifiedKey::RsaSha256Digest(r.extract()?),
KeyType::SHA256_OF_X509 => CertifiedKey::X509Sha256Digest(r.extract()?),
_ => CertifiedKey::Unrecognized(UnrecognizedKey {
key_type,
key_digest: r.extract()?,
}),
})
/// An extension in a Tor certificate.
enum CertExt {
/// Indicates which Ed25519 public key signed this cert.
SignedWithEd25519(SignedWithEd25519Ext),
/// An extension whose identity we don't recognize.
Unrecognized(UnrecognizedExt),
/// Any unrecognized extension on a Tor certificate.
struct UnrecognizedExt {
/// True iff this extension must be understand in order to validate the
/// certificate.
affects_validation: bool,
/// The type of the extension
ext_type: ExtType,
/// The body of the extension.
body: Vec<u8>,
impl CertExt {
/// Return the identifier code for this Extension.
fn ext_id(&self) -> ExtType {
CertExt::SignedWithEd25519(_) => ExtType::SIGNED_WITH_ED25519_KEY,
CertExt::Unrecognized(u) => u.ext_type,
/// Extension indicating that a key that signed a given certificate.
struct SignedWithEd25519Ext {
/// The key that signed the certificate including this extension.
pk: ed25519::Ed25519Identity,
impl Readable for CertExt {
fn take_from(b: &mut Reader<'_>) -> BytesResult<Self> {
let len = b.take_u16()?;
let ext_type: ExtType = b.take_u8()?.into();
let flags = b.take_u8()?;
let body = b.take(len as usize)?;
Ok(match ext_type {
ExtType::SIGNED_WITH_ED25519_KEY => CertExt::SignedWithEd25519(SignedWithEd25519Ext {
pk: ed25519::Ed25519Identity::from_bytes(body).ok_or_else(|| {
BytesError::InvalidMessage("wrong length on Ed25519 key".into())
})?,
_ => {
if (flags & 1) != 0 {
return Err(BytesError::InvalidMessage(
"unrecognized certificate extension, with 'affects_validation' flag set."
.into(),
));
CertExt::Unrecognized(UnrecognizedExt {
affects_validation: false,
ext_type,
body: body.into(),
impl Ed25519Cert {
/// Try to decode a certificate from a byte slice.
/// This function returns an error if the byte slice is not
/// completely exhausted.
/// Note that the resulting KeyUnknownCertificate is not checked
/// for validity at all: you will need to provide it with an expected
/// signing key, then check it for timeliness and well-signedness.
pub fn decode(cert: &[u8]) -> BytesResult<KeyUnknownCert> {
let mut r = Reader::from_slice(cert);
let v = r.take_u8()?;
if v != 1 {
// This would be something other than a "v1" certificate. We don't
// understand those.
"Unrecognized certificate version".into(),
let cert_type = r.take_u8()?.into();
let exp_hours = r.take_u32()?;
let mut cert_key_type = r.take_u8()?.into();
// This is a workaround for a tor bug: the key type is
// wrong. It was fixed in tor#40124, which got merged into Tor
// 0.4.5.x and later.
if cert_type == CertType::SIGNING_V_TLS_CERT && cert_key_type == KeyType::ED25519_KEY {
cert_key_type = KeyType::SHA256_OF_X509;
let cert_key = CertifiedKey::from_reader(cert_key_type, &mut r)?;
let n_exts = r.take_u8()?;
let mut extensions = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..n_exts {
let e: CertExt = r.extract()?;
extensions.push(e);
let sig_offset = r.consumed();
let signature: ed25519::Signature = r.extract()?;
r.should_be_exhausted()?;
let keyext = extensions
.iter()
.find(|e| e.ext_id() == ExtType::SIGNED_WITH_ED25519_KEY);
let included_pkey = match keyext {
Some(CertExt::SignedWithEd25519(s)) => Some(s.pk),
};
Ok(KeyUnknownCert {
cert: UncheckedCert {
cert: Ed25519Cert {
exp_hours,
cert_type,
cert_key,
extensions,
signed_with: included_pkey,
},
text: cert[0..sig_offset].into(),
signature,
/// Return the time at which this certificate becomes expired
pub fn expiry(&self) -> std::time::SystemTime {
let d = std::time::Duration::new(u64::from(self.exp_hours) * 3600, 0);
std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + d
/// Return true iff this certificate will be expired at the time `when`.
pub fn is_expired_at(&self, when: std::time::SystemTime) -> bool {
when >= self.expiry()
/// Return the signed key or object that is authenticated by this
pub fn subject_key(&self) -> &CertifiedKey {
&self.cert_key
/// Return the ed25519 key that signed this certificate.
pub fn signing_key(&self) -> Option<&ed25519::Ed25519Identity> {
self.signed_with.as_ref()
/// Return the type of this certificate.
pub fn cert_type(&self) -> CertType {
self.cert_type
/// A parsed Ed25519 certificate. Maybe it includes its signing key;
/// maybe it doesn't.
/// To validate this cert, either it must contain its signing key,
/// or the caller must know the signing key. In the first case, call
/// [`should_have_signing_key`](KeyUnknownCert::should_have_signing_key);
/// in the latter, call
/// [`should_be_signed_with`](KeyUnknownCert::should_be_signed_with).
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct KeyUnknownCert {
/// The certificate whose signing key might not be known.
cert: UncheckedCert,
impl KeyUnknownCert {
/// Return the certificate type of the underling cert.
pub fn peek_cert_type(&self) -> CertType {
self.cert.cert.cert_type
/// Return subject key of the underlying cert.
pub fn peek_subject_key(&self) -> &CertifiedKey {
&self.cert.cert.cert_key
/// Check whether a given pkey is (or might be) a key that has correctly
/// signed this certificate.
/// If pkey is None, this certificate must contain its signing key.
/// On success, we can check whether the certificate is well-signed;
/// otherwise, we can't check the certificate.
#[deprecated(
since = "0.7.1",
note = "Use should_have_signing_key or should_be_signed_with instead."
pub fn check_key(self, pkey: Option<&ed25519::Ed25519Identity>) -> CertResult<UncheckedCert> {
match pkey {
Some(wanted) => self.should_be_signed_with(wanted),
None => self.should_have_signing_key(),
/// Declare that this should be a self-contained certificate that contains its own
/// signing key.
/// On success, this certificate did indeed turn out to be self-contained, and so
/// we can validate it.
/// On failure, this certificate was not self-contained.
pub fn should_have_signing_key(self) -> CertResult<UncheckedCert> {
let real_key = match &self.cert.cert.signed_with {
Some(a) => *a,
None => return Err(CertError::MissingPubKey),
Ok(UncheckedCert {
signed_with: Some(real_key),
..self.cert.cert
..self.cert
/// Declare that this should be a certificate signed with a given key.
/// On success, this certificate either listed the provided key, or did not
/// list any key: in either case, we can validate it.
/// On failure, this certificate claims to be signed with a different key.
pub fn should_be_signed_with(
self,
pkey: &ed25519::Ed25519Identity,
) -> CertResult<UncheckedCert> {
Some(a) if a == pkey => *pkey,
None => *pkey,
Some(_) => return Err(CertError::KeyMismatch),
/// A certificate that has been parsed, but whose signature and
/// timeliness have not been checked.
pub struct UncheckedCert {
/// The parsed certificate, possibly modified by inserting an externally
/// supplied key as its signing key.
cert: Ed25519Cert,
/// The signed text of the certificate. (Checking ed25519 signatures
/// forces us to store this.
// TODO(nickm) It would be better to store a hash here, but we
// don't have the right Ed25519 API.
text: Vec<u8>,
/// The alleged signature
signature: ed25519::Signature,
/// A certificate that has been parsed and signature-checked, but whose
/// timeliness has not been checked.
pub struct SigCheckedCert {
/// The certificate that might or might not be timely
impl UncheckedCert {
/// Split this unchecked cert into a component that assumes it has
/// been checked, and a signature to validate.
pub fn dangerously_split(
) -> CertResult<(SigCheckedCert, ed25519::ValidatableEd25519Signature)> {
use tor_checkable::SelfSigned;
let signing_key = self.cert.signed_with.ok_or(CertError::MissingPubKey)?;
let signing_key = signing_key
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| CertError::BadSignature)?;
let signature =
ed25519::ValidatableEd25519Signature::new(signing_key, self.signature, &self.text[..]);
Ok((self.dangerously_assume_wellsigned(), signature))
&self.cert.cert_key
/// Return signing key of the underlying cert.
pub fn peek_signing_key(&self) -> &ed25519::Ed25519Identity {
self.cert
.signed_with
.as_ref()
.expect("Made an UncheckedCert without a signing key")
impl tor_checkable::SelfSigned<SigCheckedCert> for UncheckedCert {
type Error = CertError;
fn is_well_signed(&self) -> CertResult<()> {
let pubkey = &self.cert.signed_with.ok_or(CertError::MissingPubKey)?;
let pubkey: ed25519::PublicKey = pubkey.try_into().map_err(|_| CertError::BadSignature)?;
pubkey
.verify(&self.text[..], &self.signature)
Ok(())
fn dangerously_assume_wellsigned(self) -> SigCheckedCert {
SigCheckedCert { cert: self.cert }
impl tor_checkable::Timebound<Ed25519Cert> for Ed25519Cert {
type Error = tor_checkable::TimeValidityError;
fn is_valid_at(&self, t: &time::SystemTime) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
if self.is_expired_at(*t) {
let expiry = self.expiry();
Err(Self::Error::Expired(
t.duration_since(expiry)
.expect("certificate expiry time inconsistent"),
))
} else {
fn dangerously_assume_timely(self) -> Ed25519Cert {
self
impl tor_checkable::Timebound<Ed25519Cert> for SigCheckedCert {
fn is_valid_at(&self, t: &time::SystemTime) -> std::result::Result<(), Self::Error> {
self.cert.is_valid_at(t)
self.cert.dangerously_assume_timely()
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
// @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]
#![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]
#![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::unchecked_duration_subtraction)]
#![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
//! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
use super::*;
use hex_literal::hex;
#[test]
fn parse_unrecognized_ext() -> BytesResult<()> {
// case one: a flag is set but we don't know it
let b = hex!("0009 99 10 657874656e73696f6e");
let mut r = Reader::from_slice(&b);
assert_eq!(e.ext_id(), 0x99.into());
// case two: we've been told to ignore the cert if we can't
// handle the extension.
let b = hex!("0009 99 11 657874656e73696f6e");
let e: Result<CertExt, BytesError> = r.extract();
assert!(e.is_err());
assert_eq!(
e.err().unwrap(),
BytesError::InvalidMessage(
"unrecognized certificate extension, with 'affects_validation' flag set.".into()
)
);
fn certified_key() -> BytesResult<()> {
let b =
hex!("4c27616d6f757220756e6974206365757820717527656e636861c3ae6e616974206c6520666572");
let ck = CertifiedKey::from_reader(KeyType::SHA256_OF_RSA, &mut r)?;
assert_eq!(ck.as_bytes(), &b[..32]);
assert_eq!(ck.key_type(), KeyType::SHA256_OF_RSA);
assert_eq!(r.remaining(), 7);
let ck = CertifiedKey::from_reader(42.into(), &mut r)?;
assert_eq!(ck.key_type(), 42.into());