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//! Handle the middle document of an onion service descriptor.
use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use tor_hscrypto::pk::{HsBlindId, HsClientDescEncSecretKey, HsSvcDescEncKey};
use tor_hscrypto::{RevisionCounter, Subcredential};
use tor_llcrypto::pk::curve25519;
use tor_llcrypto::util::ct::CtByteArray;
use crate::doc::hsdesc::desc_enc::build_descriptor_cookie_key;
use crate::parse::tokenize::{Item, NetDocReader};
use crate::parse::{keyword::Keyword, parser::SectionRules};
use crate::types::misc::B64;
use crate::{Pos, Result};
use super::desc_enc::{
HsDescEncNonce, HsDescEncryption, HS_DESC_CLIENT_ID_LEN, HS_DESC_ENC_NONCE_LEN, HS_DESC_IV_LEN,
};
use super::HsDescError;
/// The only currently recognized `desc-auth-type`.
//
// TODO: In theory this should be an enum, if we ever add a second value here.
pub(super) const HS_DESC_AUTH_TYPE: &str = "x25519";
/// A more-or-less verbatim representation of the middle document of an onion
/// service descriptor.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "hsdesc-inner-docs", visibility::make(pub))]
pub(super) struct HsDescMiddle {
/// A public key used by authorized clients to decrypt the key used to
/// decrypt the encryption layer and decode the inner document. This is
/// ignored if restricted discovery is not in use.
///
/// This is `KP_hss_desc_enc`, and appears as `desc-auth-ephemeral-key` in
/// the document format; It is used along with `KS_hsc_desc_enc` to perform
/// a diffie-hellman operation and decrypt the encryption layer.
svc_desc_enc_key: HsSvcDescEncKey,
/// One or more authorized clients, and the key exchange information that
/// they use to compute shared keys for decrypting the encryption layer.
/// Each of these is parsed from a `auth-client` line.
auth_clients: Vec<AuthClient>,
/// The (encrypted) inner document of the onion service descriptor.
encrypted: Vec<u8>,
}
impl HsDescMiddle {
/// Decrypt the encrypted inner document contained within this middle
/// document.
/// If present, `key` is an authorization key, and we assume that the
/// decryption is nontrivial.
/// A failure may mean either that the encryption was corrupted, or that we
/// didn't have the right key.
pub(super) fn decrypt_inner(
&self,
blinded_id: &HsBlindId,
revision: RevisionCounter,
subcredential: &Subcredential,
key: Option<&HsClientDescEncSecretKey>,
) -> std::result::Result<Vec<u8>, super::HsDescError> {
let desc_enc_nonce = key.and_then(|k| self.find_cookie(subcredential, k));
let decrypt = HsDescEncryption {
blinded_id,
desc_enc_nonce: desc_enc_nonce.as_ref(),
subcredential,
revision,
string_const: b"hsdir-encrypted-data",
match decrypt.decrypt(&self.encrypted) {
Ok(mut v) => {
// Work around a bug in an implementation we presume to be
// OnionBalance: it doesn't NL-terminate the final line of the
// inner document.
if !v.ends_with(b"\n") {
v.push(b'\n');
Ok(v)
Err(_) => match (key, desc_enc_nonce) {
(Some(_), None) => Err(HsDescError::WrongDecryptionKey),
(Some(_), Some(_)) => Err(HsDescError::DecryptionFailed),
(None, _) => Err(HsDescError::MissingDecryptionKey),
},
/// Use a `ClientDescAuthSecretKey` (`KS_hsc_desc_enc`) to see if there is any `auth-client`
/// entry for us (a client who holds that secret key) in this descriptor.
/// If so, decrypt it and return its
/// corresponding "Descriptor Cookie" (`N_hs_desc_enc`)
/// If no such `N_hs_desc_enc` is found, then either we do not have
/// permission to decrypt the encryption layer, OR no permission is required.
/// (The protocol makes it intentionally impossible to distinguish any error
/// conditions here other than "no cookie for you.")
fn find_cookie(
ks_hsc_desc_enc: &HsClientDescEncSecretKey,
) -> Option<HsDescEncNonce> {
use cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher};
use tor_llcrypto::cipher::aes::Aes256Ctr as Cipher;
use tor_llcrypto::util::ct::ct_lookup;
let (client_id, cookie_key) = build_descriptor_cookie_key(
ks_hsc_desc_enc.as_ref(),
&self.svc_desc_enc_key,
);
// See whether there is any matching client_id in self.auth_ids.
let auth_client = ct_lookup(&self.auth_clients, |c| c.client_id.ct_eq(&client_id))?;
// We found an auth client entry: Take and decrypt the cookie `N_hs_desc_enc` at last.
let mut cookie = auth_client.encrypted_cookie;
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(&cookie_key.into(), &auth_client.iv.into());
cipher.apply_keystream(&mut cookie);
Some(cookie.into())
/// Information that a single authorized client can use to decrypt the onion
pub(super) struct AuthClient {
/// A check field that clients can use to see if this [`AuthClient`] entry corresponds
/// to a key they hold.
/// This is the first part of the `auth-client` line.
pub(super) client_id: CtByteArray<HS_DESC_CLIENT_ID_LEN>,
/// An IV used to decrypt `encrypted_cookie`.
/// This is the second item on the `auth-client` line.
pub(super) iv: [u8; HS_DESC_IV_LEN],
/// An encrypted value used to find the descriptor cookie `N_hs_desc_enc`,
/// which in turn is
/// needed to decrypt the [HsDescMiddle]'s `encrypted_body`.
/// This is the third item on the `auth-client` line. When decrypted, it
/// reveals a `DescEncEncryptionCookie` (`N_hs_desc_enc`, not yet so named
/// in the spec).
pub(super) encrypted_cookie: [u8; HS_DESC_ENC_NONCE_LEN],
impl AuthClient {
/// Try to extract an AuthClient from a single AuthClient item.
fn from_item(item: &Item<'_, HsMiddleKwd>) -> Result<Self> {
use crate::NetdocErrorKind as EK;
if item.kwd() != HsMiddleKwd::AUTH_CLIENT {
return Err(EK::Internal.with_msg("called with invalid argument."));
let client_id = item.parse_arg::<B64>(0)?.into_array()?.into();
let iv = item.parse_arg::<B64>(1)?.into_array()?;
let encrypted_cookie = item.parse_arg::<B64>(2)?.into_array()?;
Ok(AuthClient {
client_id,
iv,
encrypted_cookie,
})
decl_keyword! {
pub(crate) HsMiddleKwd {
"desc-auth-type" => DESC_AUTH_TYPE,
"desc-auth-ephemeral-key" => DESC_AUTH_EPHEMERAL_KEY,
"auth-client" => AUTH_CLIENT,
"encrypted" => ENCRYPTED,
/// Rules about how keywords appear in the middle document of an onion service
/// descriptor.
static HS_MIDDLE_RULES: Lazy<SectionRules<HsMiddleKwd>> = Lazy::new(|| {
use HsMiddleKwd::*;
let mut rules = SectionRules::builder();
rules.add(DESC_AUTH_TYPE.rule().required().args(1..));
rules.add(DESC_AUTH_EPHEMERAL_KEY.rule().required().args(1..));
rules.add(AUTH_CLIENT.rule().required().may_repeat().args(3..));
rules.add(ENCRYPTED.rule().required().obj_required());
rules.add(UNRECOGNIZED.rule().may_repeat().obj_optional());
rules.build()
});
/// Try to parse the middle document of an onion service descriptor from a provided
/// string.
pub(super) fn parse(s: &str) -> Result<HsDescMiddle> {
let mut reader = NetDocReader::new(s);
let result = HsDescMiddle::take_from_reader(&mut reader).map_err(|e| e.within(s))?;
Ok(result)
/// Extract an HsDescMiddle from a reader.
/// The reader must contain a single HsDescOuter; we return an error if not.
fn take_from_reader(reader: &mut NetDocReader<'_, HsMiddleKwd>) -> Result<HsDescMiddle> {
let body = HS_MIDDLE_RULES.parse(reader)?;
// Check for the only currently recognized `desc-auth-type`
{
let auth_type = body.required(DESC_AUTH_TYPE)?.required_arg(0)?;
if auth_type != HS_DESC_AUTH_TYPE {
return Err(EK::BadDocumentVersion
.at_pos(Pos::at(auth_type))
.with_msg(format!("Unrecognized desc-auth-type {auth_type:?}")));
// Extract `KP_hss_desc_enc` from DESC_AUTH_EPHEMERAL_KEY
let ephemeral_key: HsSvcDescEncKey = {
let token = body.required(DESC_AUTH_EPHEMERAL_KEY)?;
let key = curve25519::PublicKey::from(token.parse_arg::<B64>(0)?.into_array()?);
key.into()
// Parse all the auth-client lines.
let auth_clients: Vec<AuthClient> = body
.slice(AUTH_CLIENT)
.iter()
.map(AuthClient::from_item)
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
// The encrypted body is taken verbatim.
let encrypted_body: Vec<u8> = body.required(ENCRYPTED)?.obj("MESSAGE")?;
Ok(HsDescMiddle {
svc_desc_enc_key: ephemeral_key,
auth_clients,
encrypted: encrypted_body,
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
// @@ begin test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@
#![allow(clippy::bool_assert_comparison)]
#![allow(clippy::clone_on_copy)]
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro)]
#![allow(clippy::mixed_attributes_style)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
#![allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
#![allow(clippy::single_char_pattern)]
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
#![allow(clippy::unchecked_duration_subtraction)]
#![allow(clippy::useless_vec)]
#![allow(clippy::needless_pass_by_value)]
//! <!-- @@ end test lint list maintained by maint/add_warning @@ -->
use hex_literal::hex;
use tor_checkable::{SelfSigned, Timebound};
use super::*;
use crate::doc::hsdesc::{
outer::HsDescOuter,
test_data::{TEST_DATA, TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL},
#[test]
fn parse_good() -> Result<()> {
let desc = HsDescOuter::parse(TEST_DATA)?
.dangerously_assume_wellsigned()
.dangerously_assume_timely();
let subcred = TEST_SUBCREDENTIAL.into();
let body = desc.decrypt_body(&subcred).unwrap();
let body = std::str::from_utf8(&body[..]).unwrap();
let middle = HsDescMiddle::parse(body)?;
assert_eq!(
middle.svc_desc_enc_key.as_bytes(),
&hex!("161090571E6DB517C0C8591CE524A56DF17BAE3FF8DCD50735F9AEB89634073E")
assert_eq!(middle.auth_clients.len(), 16);
// Here we make sure that decryption "works" minimally and returns some
// bytes for a descriptor with no HsClientDescEncSecretKey.
// We make sure that the actual decrypted value is reasonable elsewhere,
// in the tests in inner.rs.
// We test the case where a HsClientDescEncSecretKey is needed
// elsewhere, in `hsdesc::test::parse_desc_auth_good`.
let _inner_body = middle
.decrypt_inner(&desc.blinded_id(), desc.revision_counter(), &subcred, None)
.unwrap();
Ok(())