Topaicí Éagsúla

Is oth linn a rá go bhfuil bogearra mailíseach ar do ríomhaire. Ní muidne a chruthaigh an bogearra mailíseach seo. Tá na daoine a chruthaigh é ag iarraidh ort Brabhsálaí Tor a íoslódáil anois sa chaoi go mbeidh tú in ann dul i dteagmháil leo gan ainm chun an t-airgead fuascailte a íoc.

Más é seo an chéad uair a chuala tú faoi Bhrabhsálaí Tor, b'fhéidir go gceapann tú gur drochdhaoine muid, agus go soláthraímid uirlisí do dhaoine fiú níos measa.

Ach leis an bhfírinne a rá, úsáideann go leor daoine ár gcuid bogearraí go laethúil ar bhealaí dlisteanacha: gníomhaithe ar son cearta daonna, iriseoirí, daoine a tháinig slán ó dhroch-íde sa mbaile, daoine nochta scéil, gardaí, agus neart eile. Faraor, is féidir le coirpigh agus le húdair bogearraí mailíseacha leas a bhaint as an gcosaint chéanna a sholáthraíonn Tor do na grúpaí seo. Níl aon ghlacadh againn le daoine a úsáideann ár gcuid bogearraí ar bhealaí mailíseacha.

You can read all about that on our Trademark faq page.

Even if your application is using the correct variant of the SOCKS protocol, there is still a risk that it could be leaking DNS queries. This problem happens in Firefox extensions that resolve the destination hostname themselves, for example to show you its IP address, what country it's in, etc. If you suspect your application might behave like this, follow the instructions below to check.

  1. Add TestSocks 1 to your torrc file.
  2. Start Tor, and point your program's SOCKS proxy settings to Tor's SOCKS5 server (socks5://127.0.0.1:9050 by default).
  3. Watch your logs as you use your application. For each socks connection, Tor will log a notice for safe connections, and a warn for connections leaking DNS requests.

If you want to automatically disable all connections leaking DNS requests, set SafeSocks 1 in your torrc file.

Dearadh Tor chun cearta daonna agus príobháideachas a chosaint trí chosc a chur ar dhaoine cinsireacht a dhéanamh, muidne san áireamh. Is fuath linn go ndéanann daoine áirithe rudaí uafásacha ar líonra Tor, ach ní féidir linn bata is bóthar a thabhairt dóibh gan go leor gníomhaíoch, iriseoirí, agus daoine a tháinig slán ó dhroch-íde a chur i gcontúirt. Dá gcuirfimis cosc ar dhaoine áirithe, an bealach amháin a bheadh againn é sin a dhéanamh ná saghas "cúldorais" a chur ar fáil, rud a chuirfeadh ár gcuid úsáideoirí ionraice i gcontúirt ó dhrochrialtais agus ó naimhde eile.

Ní choinníonn Tor aon logchomhad a chabhródh linn úsáideoirí a aithint. We do take some safe measurements of how the network functions, which you can check out at Tor Metrics.

Ní dhéanaimid cothabháil ar Vidalia a thuilleadh. Tá cuid mhaith de na gnéithe in Vidalia ar fáil i mBrabhsálaí Tor anois.

Faoi láthair, tá Tor códáilte le 3 nód a úsáid, móide líon na n-athsheachadán sa chosán atá íogair. Is é sin le rá, úsáideann sé 3 cinn de ghnáth, ach má tá tú ag úsáid seirbhíse onion nó seoladh ".exit", d'fhéadfadh sé a bheith níos mó ná 3 cinn.

Níor mhaith linn moladh do dhaoine cosáin níos faide a úsáid toisc go gcruthódh sé sin lód níos troime ar an líonra, gan (go bhfios dúinn) slándáil a fheabhsú. Also, using paths longer than 3 could harm anonymity, first because it makes denial of security attacks easier, and second because it could act as an identifier if only a small number of users have the same path length as you.

No. After eleven beta releases, we discontinued support of Tor Messenger. Creidimid go bhféadfaí Tor a úsáid in aip chumarsáide den sórt seo, ach níl na hacmhainní againn faoi láthair lena dhéanamh. Do you? Contact us.

Tor relies on the support of users and volunteers around the world to help us improve our software and resources, so your feedback is extremely valuable to us (and to all Tor users).

Feedback template

When sending us feedback or reporting a bug, please include as many of these as possible:

  • Operating System you are using
  • Tor Browser version
  • Tor Browser Security Level
  • Step by step of how you got to the issue, so we can reproduce it (e.g. I opened the browser, typed a url, clicked on (i) icon, then my browser crashed)
  • A screenshot of the problem
  • The log

How to Reach Us

There are several ways to reach us, so please use what works best for you.

Tor Forum

We recommend asking for help on the Tor Forum. You will need to create an account to submit a new topic. Before you ask, please review our discussion guidelines. At the moment, for the fastest response, please write in English. If you found a bug, please use GitLab.

GitLab

First, check if the bug is already known. You can search and read all the issues at https://gitlab.torproject.org/. To create a new issue, please request a new account to access Tor Project's GitLab instance and find the right repository to report your issue. We track all Tor Browser related issues at Tor Browser issue tracker. Issues related to our websites should be filed under the Web issue tracker.

Email

Send us an email to frontdesk@torproject.org

In the subject line of your email, please tell us what you're reporting. The more specific your subject line is (e.g. "Connection failure", "feedback on website", "feedback on Tor Browser, "I need a bridge"), the easier it will be for us to understand and follow up. Sometimes when we receive emails without subject lines, they're marked as spam and we don't see them.

For the fastest response, please write in English, Spanish, and/or Portuguese if you can. If none of these languages works for you, please write in any language you feel comfortable with, but keep in mind it will take us a bit longer to answer as we will need help with translation to understand it.

Blog post comments

You can always leave comments on the blog post related to the issue or feedback you want to report. If there is not a blog post related to your issue, please contact us another way.

IRC

You can find us in the #tor channel on OFTC to give us feedback or report bugs/issues. We may not respond right away, but we do check the backlog and will get back to you when we can.

Learn how to connect to OFTC servers.

Email Lists

For reporting issues or feedback using email lists, we recommend that you do so on the one that is related to what you would like to report. A complete directory of our mailing lists can be found here.

For feedback or issues related to Tor Browser, Tor network or other projects developed by Tor: tor-talk

For feedback or issues related to our websites: ux

For feedback or issues related to running a Tor relay: tor-relays

For feedback on content related to Tor Browser Manual or Support website: tor-community-team

Report a security issue

If you've found a security issue in one of our projects or in our infrastructure, please email tor-security@lists.torproject.org. If you've found a security bug in Tor or Tor Browser, feel free to submit it for our bug bounty program. If you want to encrypt your mail, you can get the GPG public key for the list by contacting tor-security-sendkey@lists.torproject.org or from pool.sks-keyservers.net. Here is the fingerprint:

  gpg --fingerprint tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  pub 4096R/1A7BF184 2017-03-13
  Key fingerprint = 8B90 4624 C5A2 8654 E453 9BC2 E135 A8B4 1A7B F184
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  uid tor-security@lists.torproject.org
  sub 4096R/C00942E4 2017-03-13

For sharing files over Tor, OnionShare is a good option. OnionShare is an open source tool for securely and anonymously sending and receiving files using Tor onion services. It works by starting a web server directly on your computer and making it accessible as an unguessable Tor web address that others can load in Tor Browser to download files from you, or upload files to you. It doesn't require setting up a separate server, using a third party file-sharing service, or even logging into an account.

Unlike services like email, Google Drive, DropBox, WeTransfer, or nearly any other way people typically send files to each other, when you use OnionShare you don't give any companies access to the files that you're sharing. So long as you share the unguessable web address in a secure way (like pasting it in an encrypted messaging app), no one but you and the person you're sharing with can access the files.

OnionShare is developed by Micah Lee.

Cumraítear go leor athsheachadán le cosc a chur ar chineálacha áirithe tráchta a bhaineann le comhroinnt comhad, mar shampla BitTorrent. BitTorrent in particular is not anonymous over Tor.

Go raibh maith agat as tacú le Tor! You can find more information about donating on our donor FAQ.

Tá Tor á mhaoiniú ag urraitheoirí éagsúla, gníomhaireachtaí rialtais SAM, fondúireachtaí príobháideacha, agus daoine aonair san áireamh. Check out a list of all our sponsors and a series of blog posts on our financial reports.

We feel that talking openly about our sponsors and funding model is the best way to maintain trust with our community. Bímid ag lorg foinsí maoinithe níos ilchineálaí i gcónaí, go háirithe ó fhondúireachtaí agus ó dhaoine aonair.

Ní mholaimid duit Tor a úsáid le BitTorrent. For further details, please see our blog post on the subject.

Ní chuirimid aon seirbhísí ar líne ar fáil. A list of all of our software projects can be found on our projects page.

Please see our community page for how to get involved!

Níl forbróirí Tor in ann aon rud a dhéanamh chun úsáideoirí Tor a lorg. Ní féidir linn úsáideoirí a lorg mar gheall ar na gnéithe céanna a chosnaíonn do chuid faisnéis phearsanta ar dhrochdhaoine.

There are a few reasons we don't:

  1. We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
  2. If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users, they can.
  3. Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not, what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.