fs_mistrust/
imp.rs

1//! Implementation logic for `fs-mistrust`.
2
3use std::{
4    fs::{FileType, Metadata},
5    path::Path,
6};
7
8#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
9use std::os::unix::prelude::MetadataExt;
10
11use crate::{
12    Error, Result, Type,
13    walk::{PathType, ResolvePath},
14};
15
16/// Definition for the "sticky bit", which on Unix means that the contents of
17/// directory may not be renamed, deleted, or otherwise modified by a non-owner
18/// of those contents, even if the user has write permissions on the directory.
19///
20/// This is the usual behavior for /tmp: You can make your own directories in
21/// /tmp, but you can't modify other people's.
22///
23/// (We'd use libc's version of `S_ISVTX`, but they vacillate between u16 and
24/// u32 depending what platform you're on.)
25#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
26pub(crate) const STICKY_BIT: u32 = 0o1000;
27
28/// Helper: Box an iterator of errors.
29fn boxed<'a, I: Iterator<Item = Error> + 'a>(iter: I) -> Box<dyn Iterator<Item = Error> + 'a> {
30    Box::new(iter)
31}
32
33impl<'a> super::Verifier<'a> {
34    /// Return an iterator of all the security problems with `path`.
35    ///
36    /// If the iterator is empty, then there is no problem with `path`.
37    //
38    // TODO: This iterator is not fully lazy; sometimes, calls to check_one()
39    // return multiple errors when it would be better for them to return only
40    // one (since we're ignoring errors after the first).  This might be nice
41    // to fix in the future if we can do so without adding much complexity
42    // to the code.  It's not urgent, since the allocations won't cost much
43    // compared to the filesystem access.
44    pub(crate) fn check_errors(&self, path: &Path) -> impl Iterator<Item = Error> + '_ + use<'_> {
45        if self.mistrust.is_disabled() {
46            // We don't want to walk the path in this case at all: we'll just
47            // look at the last element.
48
49            let meta = match path.metadata() {
50                Ok(meta) => meta,
51                Err(e) => return boxed(vec![Error::inspecting(e, path)].into_iter()),
52            };
53            let mut errors = Vec::new();
54            self.check_type(path, PathType::Final, &meta, &mut errors);
55            return boxed(errors.into_iter());
56        }
57
58        let rp = match ResolvePath::new(path) {
59            Ok(rp) => rp,
60            Err(e) => return boxed(vec![e].into_iter()),
61        };
62
63        // Filter to remove every path that is a prefix of ignore_prefix. (IOW,
64        // if stop_at_dir is /home/arachnidsGrip, real_stop_at_dir will be
65        // /home, and we'll ignore / and /home.)
66        let should_retain = move |r: &Result<_>| match (r, &self.mistrust.ignore_prefix) {
67            (Ok((p, _, _)), Some(ignore_prefix)) => !ignore_prefix.starts_with(p),
68            (_, _) => true,
69        };
70
71        boxed(
72            rp.filter(should_retain)
73                // Finally, check the path for errors.
74                //
75                // See `check_one` below for a note on TOCTOU issues.
76                .flat_map(move |r| match r {
77                    Ok((path, path_type, metadata)) => {
78                        self.check_one(path.as_path(), path_type, &metadata)
79                    }
80                    Err(e) => vec![e],
81                }),
82        )
83    }
84
85    /// If check_contents is set, return an iterator over all the errors in
86    /// elements _contained in this directory_.
87    #[cfg(feature = "walkdir")]
88    pub(crate) fn check_content_errors(
89        &self,
90        path: &Path,
91    ) -> impl Iterator<Item = Error> + '_ + use<'_> {
92        use std::sync::Arc;
93
94        if !self.check_contents || self.mistrust.is_disabled() {
95            return boxed(std::iter::empty());
96        }
97
98        boxed(
99            walkdir::WalkDir::new(path)
100                .follow_links(false)
101                .min_depth(1)
102                .into_iter()
103                .flat_map(move |ent| match ent {
104                    Err(err) => vec![Error::Listing(Arc::new(err))],
105                    Ok(ent) => match ent.metadata() {
106                        Ok(meta) => self
107                            .check_one(ent.path(), PathType::Content, &meta)
108                            .into_iter()
109                            .map(|e| Error::Content(Box::new(e)))
110                            .collect(),
111                        Err(err) => vec![Error::Listing(Arc::new(err))],
112                    },
113                }),
114        )
115    }
116
117    /// Return an empty iterator.
118    #[cfg(not(feature = "walkdir"))]
119    pub(crate) fn check_content_errors(&self, _path: &Path) -> impl Iterator<Item = Error> + '_ {
120        std::iter::empty()
121    }
122
123    /// Check a single `path` for conformance with this `Verifier`.
124    ///
125    /// Note that this result is only meaningful if all of the _ancestors_ of
126    /// this path have been checked.  Otherwise, a non-trusted user could change
127    /// where this path points after it has been checked.
128    #[must_use]
129    pub(crate) fn check_one(
130        &self,
131        path: &Path,
132        path_type: PathType,
133        meta: &Metadata,
134    ) -> Vec<Error> {
135        let mut errors = Vec::new();
136
137        self.check_type(path, path_type, meta, &mut errors);
138        #[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
139        self.check_permissions(path, path_type, meta, &mut errors);
140        errors
141    }
142
143    /// Check whether a given file has the correct type, and push an error into
144    /// `errors` if not. Other inputs are as for `check_one`.
145    fn check_type(
146        &self,
147        path: &Path,
148        path_type: PathType,
149        meta: &Metadata,
150        errors: &mut Vec<Error>,
151    ) {
152        let want_type = match path_type {
153            PathType::Symlink => {
154                // There's nothing to check on a symlink encountered _while
155                // looking up the target_; its permissions and ownership do not
156                // actually matter.
157                return;
158            }
159            PathType::Intermediate => Type::Dir,
160            PathType::Final => self.enforce_type,
161            PathType::Content => Type::DirOrFile,
162        };
163
164        if !want_type.matches(meta.file_type()) {
165            errors.push(Error::BadType(path.into()));
166        }
167    }
168
169    /// Check whether a given file has the correct ownership and permissions,
170    /// and push errors into `errors` if not. Other inputs are as for
171    /// `check_one`.
172    ///
173    /// On iOS, check permissions but assumes the owner is the current user.
174    #[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
175    fn check_permissions(
176        &self,
177        path: &Path,
178        path_type: PathType,
179        meta: &Metadata,
180        errors: &mut Vec<Error>,
181    ) {
182        // We need to check that the owner is trusted, since the owner can
183        // always change the permissions of the object.  (If we're talking
184        // about a directory, the owner cah change the permissions and owner
185        // of anything in the directory.)
186
187        #[cfg(all(
188            not(target_os = "ios"),
189            not(target_os = "tvos"),
190            not(target_os = "android")
191        ))]
192        {
193            let uid = meta.uid();
194            if uid != 0 && Some(uid) != self.mistrust.trust_user {
195                errors.push(Error::BadOwner(path.into(), uid));
196            }
197        }
198
199        // On Unix-like platforms, symlink permissions are ignored (and usually
200        // not settable). Theoretically, the symlink owner shouldn't matter, but
201        // it's less confusing to consistently require the right owner.
202        if path_type == PathType::Symlink {
203            return;
204        }
205
206        let mut forbidden_bits = if !self.readable_okay && path_type == PathType::Final {
207            // If this is the target object, and it must not be readable, then
208            // we forbid it to be group-rwx and all-rwx.
209            //
210            // (We allow _content_ to be globally readable even if readable_okay
211            // is false, since we check that the Final directory is itself
212            // unreadable.  This is okay unless the content has hard links: see
213            // the Limitations section of the crate-level documentation.)
214            0o077
215        } else {
216            // If this is the target object and it may be readable, or if this
217            // is _any parent directory_ or any content, then we typically
218            // forbid the group-write and all-write bits.  (Those are the bits
219            // that would allow non-trusted users to change the object, or
220            // change things around in a directory.)
221            if meta.is_dir() && meta.mode() & STICKY_BIT != 0 && path_type == PathType::Intermediate
222            {
223                // This is an intermediate directory and this sticky bit is
224                // set.  Thus, we don't care if it is world-writable or
225                // group-writable, since only the _owner_  of a file in this
226                // directory can move or rename it.
227                0o000
228            } else {
229                // It's not a sticky-bit intermediate directory; actually
230                // forbid 022.
231                0o022
232            }
233        };
234        // If we trust the GID, then we allow even more bits to be set.
235        #[cfg(all(
236            not(target_os = "ios"),
237            not(target_os = "tvos"),
238            not(target_os = "android")
239        ))]
240        if self.mistrust.trust_group == Some(meta.gid()) {
241            forbidden_bits &= !0o070;
242        }
243
244        // Both iOS and Android have some directory on the path for application data directory
245        // which is group writeable. However both system already offer some guarantees regarding
246        // application data being kept away from other apps.
247        //
248        // iOS: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/FileManagement/Conceptual/FileSystemProgrammingGuide/FileSystemOverview/FileSystemOverview.html
249        // > For security purposes, an iOS app’s interactions with the file system are limited
250        // to the directories inside the app’s sandbox directory
251        //
252        // Android: https://developer.android.com/training/data-storage
253        // > App-specific storage: [...] Use the directories within internal storage to save
254        // sensitive information that other apps shouldn't access.
255        #[cfg(any(target_os = "ios", target_os = "tvos", target_os = "android"))]
256        {
257            forbidden_bits &= !0o070;
258        }
259
260        let bad_bits = meta.mode() & forbidden_bits;
261        if bad_bits != 0 {
262            errors.push(Error::BadPermission(
263                path.into(),
264                meta.mode() & 0o777,
265                bad_bits,
266            ));
267        }
268    }
269}
270
271impl super::Type {
272    /// Return true if this required type is matched by a given `FileType`
273    /// object.
274    fn matches(&self, have_type: FileType) -> bool {
275        match self {
276            Type::Dir => have_type.is_dir(),
277            Type::File => have_type.is_file(),
278            Type::DirOrFile => have_type.is_dir() || have_type.is_file(),
279            Type::Anything => true,
280        }
281    }
282}